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17. Strange Bedfellows? Representative Democracy and Academic
Engagement with the Defense Industry
Steven L. Schooner and Evan Matsuda
Introduction: Gee, This Seems Important
“What gets measured gets managed” is a popular mantra among government performance
management advocates.1 In representative democracy, the converse might be “out of sight, out of
mind.” How did the United States come to be a government, originally created to be responsive
to the will of its people, that boasts the world’s most powerful military, spends more scarce
resources on its military than any other, and exports the most kinetic capacity? How can such a
public not study, research, analyze, think, and talk about the ethical aspects of its defense
industry?
1. Ms. Frizzle Was Right: Question Everything2
In his iconic piece, Lighthouse No Good,3 William Prosser chronicled an intriguing, if
slightly disorienting, career in legal education. Prosser begins:
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Lighthouse, him no good for fog.
Lighthouse, him whistle, him blow,
him ring bell, him flash light, him raise hell;
but fog come in just the same.

D

He then meanders his way to an unnerving epiphany, in which an aging, truthful professor
responds to the query: “How do you teach law?” as he was himself answered so many years
before: “I don’t know. None of us knows.”4
But experience, at a minimum, reveals how not to teach law. For example, when teaching
issues related to defense acquisition, government contracts, and the policies that animate “the
For an accessible example of the literature, see KATHERINE BARRETT & RICHARD GREENE, MAKING GOVERNMENT
WORK: THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF PERFORMANCE-INFORMED MANAGEMENT (2020). For a critique of the
mantra, see John Kamensky, Does Performance Matter?, IBM CTR. FOR BUS. GOV’T (Mar. 28, 2016) (citing Ed
Gerrish, The Impact of Performance Management in Public Organizations: A Meta-Analysis, 76 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
48 (2015)), https://www.businessofgovernment.org/blog/does-performance-matter.
1

“Get messy, take chances, make mistakes!” exhorts Ms. Frizzle, voiced by the incomparable Lily Tomlin. The
Magic School Bus (Scholastic 1994–1997).
2

William L. Prosser, Lighthouse No Good, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 257, 257 (1948) (recounting a quotation reportedly
“spoken by a West Coast Indian, sitting on a rock and looking out to sea”). When one of us left his procurement
policy job to become a full-time academic, his spouse, who had previously joined the legal academy, recommended
the Prosser piece. Regardless of whether or not either of us understood the piece, it did make us think.
3

4

Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
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business of government,” it is a fool’s errand to expect students to learn all of the relevant rules.
Not only are there far too many, but Congress can—and frequently does—change (or supplement
or delete or replace) them. Conversely, students benefit enormously if they learn how to interpret
and implement rules. And they most rapidly ascend the learning curve if they can identify and
understand the underlying policies that animate the rules.
This book offers students, the academy, defense industry professionals, and policymakers
a wonderful opportunity to question many things we take for granted about the defense industry.
Focusing on the underlying policies, and asking the why question, rather than simply how or
what, is a valuable exercise because the military enterprise, the defense industry, and the market
that binds private sector contractors with government customers are sprawling, impenetrable to
the uninitiated, overwhelming to the casual observer, and riddled with inconsistent policies. For
example, in our classrooms, students learn that:
On one hand, statute and regulation demand that government contractors maintain
complex, sophisticated, and costly compliance regimes. On the other hand, Congress
mandates that nearly a quarter of all procurement dollars be funneled to small businesses
that frequently lack the resources to establish effective compliance programs or the
wherewithal to appreciate the risk of doing business without them.5

•

The primary regulatory guidance makes clear that “[b]oth the Government and
contractors should be concerned with profit as a motivator of efficient and effective
contract performance.”6 However, congressional rhetoric and longstanding norms
celebrate minimizing contractor profit, and contractors supporting the military in the

D
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•

See, generally, FAR Subpart 9.1 for the premise that the government should only do business with “responsible”
contractors and Subpart 9.4, which discusses debarment, suspension, and ineligibility. Not surprisingly, a generation
of empirical data demonstrates that, while large, important contractors are almost never blacklisted or excluded from
competing for government work, staggering numbers of small (and, apparently, dispensable) small businesses are
routinely suspended, proposed for debarment, and debarred. In Chapter 14, Chris Yukins eloquently demonstrates
this asymmetry: “[A] firm without an effective compliance system in place . . . is left exposed to potentially
disastrous risks, both of substantive violations and of failing to make the mandated disclosure of those violations. In
sum, the mandatory disclosure rule exacerbates the competitive disadvantages borne by small- and medium-sized
enterprises.” Yukins at ____. In Chapter 15, Jessica Tillipman, along with Vijaya Surampudi, remind us that, while
some of these disparities can be reduced, it is unrealistic to assume them away: “Large contractors make significant
investments in their ethics and compliance programs, and some view their programs as proprietary and confidential.
Many contractors fear that competitors will exploit this information if they share it publicly. Yet, by depriving small
businesses access to this information and resources, the large contractors may ultimately be harmed if the suppliers
suffer from compliance deficiencies or failures.” Tillipman & Surampudi at ____; see also infra text accompanying
notes 61–63 regarding these compliance programs.
5

FAR 15.404-4(a)(3). Many find this medicine difficult to swallow. For example, in Chapter 1, Tobias Vestner
asserts that “the main ethical issue relates to the product: weapons and military technologies are tools to kill people.
Making profits from this activity is problematic as a matter of principle . . . .” Vestner at __ (16). Putting aside how
this perspective might apply to the (admittedly dubious) ethics of the National Rifle Association (NRA) and its
members, including the domestic handgun and rifle manufacturers, which are beyond the scope of this chapter and
book, severing the profit motive from defense contracting feels analogous to the increasingly quaint aspiration that
the government maintain a monopoly over the use of force but, alas, runs contrary to the conventional incentives
underlying outsourcing, reliance on the private sector, and, ultimately, capitalism.
6
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battlefield are described pejoratively as “profiteers.”7
•

It is government policy to consolidate its purchasing requirements to achieve the benefits
of economies of scale, but at the same time it is prohibited by law to aggregate or
consolidate or “bundle” purchases that would make it impossible for small business to
compete for the government’s business.8

Complexity is a given in the defense industry,9 and that complexity gives rise to
fascinating, frustrating, difficult, and nuanced questions. But complexity and conflicting
priorities afford no justification for avoiding academic discourse. To the contrary, when the U.S.
government maintains such a massive kinetic arsenal, boasts the world’s largest military budget,

Indeed, for nearly a quarter of the twentieth century, Congress created and sustained a “Renegotiation Board,”
which retroactively clawed back “excessive” contractor profits. The board plied its trade from 1951 until 1979.
Senate Vote Means End of Renegotiation Board, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 1979),
https://www.nytimes.com/1979/04/03/archives/senate-vote-means-end-of-renegotiation-board.html; Renegotiation
Board—Reporting Requirement (50 U.S.C. App. § 1215)—Effect of Absence of an Appropriation—Repeals by
Implication, 3 Op. O.L.C. 318 (1979), https://www.justice.gov/file/22096/download. See also Tobias Vestner’s
Chapter 1 riff on defense contractor profits, supra note 6. Although the rationale for this phenomenon is beyond the
scope of this chapter, we would be remiss if we failed to mention than many significant government contractors—
for example, most academic institutions—are not-for-profit entities.
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See, e.g., FAR 2.101 (defining “bundling” as “a subset of consolidation that combines two or more requirements
for supplies or services, previously provided or performed under separate smaller contracts . . . into a solicitation for
a single contract . . . or . . . order that is likely to be unsuitable for award to a small business concern”). But see FAR
7.107-2 (“Consolidation may provide substantial benefits to the Government.”).
8

Indeed, we might fill another book with debate surrounding the definition and scope of “the defense industry.”
Tobias Vestner, in Chapter 1, helpfully informs a potential, thematic definition by focusing on the defense industry’s
contribution to national security. We gravitate towards (and write in the context of) a broad and inclusive definition
of the terms “military industrial base” or “defense industrial base sector,” the latter of which “provides products and
services that are essential to mobilize, deploy, and sustain military operations.” Critical Infrastructure Sectors,
CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY (emphasis added), https://www.cisa.gov/defense-industrialbase-sector (last visited Jan. 9, 2022); see also, HEIDI M. PETERS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10548, DEFENSE PRIMER:
U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE (2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10548/10 (explaining that
DoD “relies on a wide-ranging and complex industrial base for the products and services that enable the
Department’s warfighting capabilities” and that “[d]efinitions of what this industrial base encompasses vary in scope
and emphasis”(emphasis added)). CRS further explains:
9

[T]hese entities provide a wide range of products and services to the DOD, encompassing
everything from complex platforms unique to the military (e.g., aircraft carriers) and highly
specialized services (such as launching military satellites), to all kinds of commercial products
(e.g., laptop computers and semiconductors) and routine services (e.g., information technology
(IT) support).
Id. This broad and inclusive definition is critical to this book’s themes to the extent that: (1) for decades, defense
procurement of services has significantly exceeded purchases of goods or supplies, and (2) the modern realities of
outsourced defense—and the integration of, and reliance upon, service contractors in the battlespace—have
dramatically changed everything from how the military projects lethality to the nature of “sacrifice” and who makes
“the ultimate sacrifice.” See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 18, 50, 52, 88–89.
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sustains the world’s largest defense industry, and leads the world in arms exports,10 the policy
puzzles that pervade nearly every aspect of the defense industry take on even greater import. It
would be imprudent to ignore such an impactful sector of the economy.11
Moreover, as Daniel Schoeni and Tobias Vestner remind in their Introduction, the ethical
issues that permeate the defense industry and stimulate thinking in this volume are like “mowing
the grass;” they “require our constant vigilance.”12 The hard work and thought-provoking issues
are endless. For these reasons, we are flummoxed when academic institutions attempt to keep the
defense industry not just at arm’s length but out of reach and out of mind. Or, in other words,
Prosser’s lighthouse might fail to burn away the fog, but it still reveals dangers to passing ships
and, in so doing, serves a valuable purpose.

ra
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For the post-Cold War generation, Eisenhower’s familiar Military Industrial Complex
warning13 evolved from harbinger to gospel. Academic opinion, informed by congressional
oversight hearings, Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Inspector General (IG)
reports, Department of Justice (DoJ) press releases, and media coverage, tended to counsel
distance and detachment regarding the defense industry14 long before the popularity of “cancel

“The United States now spends more on defense than the next 11 spenders combined.” HARVEY M. SAPOLSKY,
EUGENE GHOLZ & CAITLIN TALMADGE, U.S DEFENSE POLITICS: THE ORIGINS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 5 (4th ed.
2021); see also 2021 Power Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., https://www.usnews.com/news/bestcountries/power-rankings (last visited Aug. 22, 2021); Chiara Vercellone, Who Were the Largest Major Arms
Exporters in the Last 5 Years?, DEF. NEWS (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.defensenews.com/2020/03/09/who-werethe-largest-major-arms-exporters-in-the-last-5-years.

D

10

11

See generally infra text accompanying note 35.

12

Schoeni & Vestner at ____.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People (Jan. 17, 1961), in
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 1960-61, at 1035 (1961).
13

During the Vietnam era, colleges and universities drove ROTC programs off campus. See Jean Marbella, ROTC
Resurgent on College Campuses Where Once Scorned, BALT. SUN, (Nov. 18, 2001),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2001-11-18-0111180052-story.html (“Many of the nation’s elite
universities, including Harvard, Yale, Columbia and Stanford, kicked ROTC off their campuses in protest of the
Vietnam War.”); Elizabeth Phelan, “A Watershed Moment”: Reflecting on the Burning of the ROTC Air Force
Building—50 Years Later, STUDENT LIFE (May 5, 2020), https://www.studlife.com/scene/2020/05/05/a-watershedmoment-reflecting-on-the-burning-of-the-rotc-air-force-building-50-years-later. Indeed, when one of us arrived at
Rice University in the 1970’s courtesy of an Army ROTC scholarship, he was surprised to find the ROTC
detachment housed in a concrete bunker underneath the Central Kitchen on the edge of campus. A generation later,
for different reasons, many law schools barred military (Judge Advocate General Corps) recruiters from campus. See
generally Doug Lederman, Wrangling over Military Recruiting, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 3, 2005),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2005/02/03/wrangling-over-military-recruiting.
14
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culture.”15 Historical analogies to the tobacco industry come to mind, just as, looking ahead, we
expect the academy to increasingly distance and divest itself from the fossil fuel industry.16
Given the importance of the defense industry to so many aspects of our lives, this brief
chapter applauds and encourages academic engagement with the defense industry and robust
discussion of, inter alia, the industry’s composition, behavior, economic footprint and impact
(and, in that context, incentives and disincentives), and role (whether as the state’s business
partner or, all too often, as a state actor).17 It is not just that these issues are ripe for debate or that
they provide innumerable research opportunities. Rather, they are a critically important
component of the kind of practical knowledge that citizenship in a representative democracy
requires. Far too many caricatures of a unitary military industrial base and its motivations are
uninformed, inaccurate, and unhelpful. Among other things, unlike cigarettes, sugar-saturated
carbonated beverages, and gasoline, national defense is critical to national security, public safety,
In reviewing our chapter, one of this volume’s editors, Tobias Vestner, raised the specter of on-campus cancel
culture. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, The Destructiveness of Call-Out Culture on Campus, ATLANTIC (May 8,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/call-out-culture-is-stressing-out-collegestudents/524679; Pippa Norris, Cancel Culture: Myth or Reality?, POL. STUD., July 16, 2021, at 1, https://journalssagepub-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/doi/pdf/10.1177/00323217211037023 (“The evidence suggests that the cancel
culture is not simply a rhetorical myth; scholars may be less willing to speak up to their moral beliefs if they believe
their views are not widely shared by colleagues . . . .”). While we consider the procedural aspects of advocacy,
disagreement, and debate, including the innumerable forms of protest, beyond the scope of this chapter, we
recognize the concern. In that context, we hope that the strength of our work and, indeed, this book, is measured by
its merits rather than its proponents’ identities. To that end, we agree with Vestner that, “in the context of ethical
dilemmas, just because someone believes [themselves] to be right (and the other to be wrong) does not mean that the
person is objectively right. . . . [I]f we lose our ability to debate and respect each other’s opinion, we lose what it
takes for a well-functioning democracy.” Our agreement, however, extends only to “informed opinions.” In
discussing critically important issues related to defense, or for that matter climate change or responses to a global
pandemic, we see more harm than good in elevating, promoting, respecting, or even tolerating “opinions” that deny
science, ignore facts, or derive exclusively from unfounded, easily debunked conspiracy theories. See, e.g., Andy
Norman, The Cause of America’s Post-Truth Predicament, SCI. AM. (May 18, 2021),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-cause-of-americas-post-truth-predicament (“When we affirm each
other’s ‘right’ to believe things—even things that fly in the face of evidence—we essentially decouple critical
thinking and belief revision. This damages the norm that keeps minds tethered to reality. . . . [W]e must grasp that
bad ideas are mind-parasites—entities that can proliferate and harm the very minds that host them. In fact, they can
lay waste to delusion-tolerant cultures.”).

D
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15

“The most successful instance of higher ed divestment arguably occurred during South African
apartheid, . . . Today, colleges and universities face pressure to divest on a number of hot button issues, with recent
efforts focused notably on fossil fuels and tobacco.” Roger Riddell, Can Higher Ed Really Affect Change Through
Divestment?, HIGHER ED DIVE (May 29, 2014), https://www.highereddive.com/news/can-higher-ed-really-affectchange-through-divestment/265675.
16

No doubt, our biases are informed by our location (and a professional career, for one of us) in Washington, D.C.
The business of government—and defense or, more broadly, national security—is fertile ground for research and
study. Our classrooms and programming are enriched by connections to the national security and intelligence
communities, the military, and the federal government in general. Indeed, the epicenter of all things defense is
housed in the world’s largest office building, just across the Potomac River and a mere three METRO stops away.
Pentagon Facts, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://pentagontours.osd.mil/Tours/facts.html; Michaila Hancock, Pentagon:
The World’s Largest Office Building – in Infographics, ARCHITECT’S J. (Aug. 27, 2015),
https://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/news/pentagon-the-worlds-largest-office-building-in-infographics.
17
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and, indeed, our very existence as a nation state. Meanwhile, we need to acknowledge the
evolution of the “industry”—from weapons manufacturing to service providers18—and
reimagine the critical role the academy can play in crafting the modern defense industry’s
behaviors, norms, standards, aspirations, and, ultimately, ethics.
2. A Sumptuous Menu
The universe of important, thought-provoking ethical issues inherent throughout the
defense industry merits discussion and study. Nonetheless, in teaching law and policy, it is easy
for ethics to recede to the background. But once you open and walk through that door, the path
skews to labyrinthian. Where does one even begin? Like perspectives, it probably depends upon
how you categorize ethics.

ra
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If “national security” is your starting point, teleological ethics grounded in maintaining
the state—or, more broadly, keeping the marauding hordes at bay—is an end that justifies
dramatic means.19 The consequences of failing to fulfill the duty to defend the state dominate,
suggesting a utilitarianism that excuses much (that, for example, a pacifist would neither
condone nor stomach). For a simple litmus test, consider the U.S. government’s resort to nuclear
weapons to accelerate the end of World War II.20 To what lengths can one go to confront that
which is evil? Whether this starts us down the slippery slope to economics and cost-benefit

Today’s “defense industry” would be unrecognizable to World War-, Korea-, and even Vietnam-era veterans,
policy officials, and academics. For example, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), promulgated in 1984,
proceeds from the assumption that federal procurement is dominated by supplies or goods, treating services as a
poorly regulated afterthought (and primarily focusing on labor relations). See generally 48 C.F.R. Today, services
dominate. Indeed, service providers Leidos, L-3, and Honeywell were recently listed among the world’s twenty
largest defense contractors. Samuel Stebbins & Evan Comen, Military Spending: 20 Companies Profiting the Most
from War, USA TODAY (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/02/21/military-spendingdefense-contractors-profiting-from-war-weapons-sales/39092315. More broadly, “[d]ollars spent on services
contracts grew steadily throughout the 1990s . . . until dipping slightly in 2008. Since then, . . . service contract
spending rose in relation to overall DoD expenditures as spending on products decreased.” Gregory Sanders et al.,
Defense Contract Trends: U.S. Department of Defense Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial Base, CTR.
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 8 (2011), https://www.csis.org/analysis/defense-contract-trends-0; see also infra
notes 50, 52; Richard L. Dunn, Defense Industry Needs New Way of Doing Business, NAT’L DEF. (Nov. 6, 2000),
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/11/6/defense-industry-needs-new-way-of-doing-business.
See also supra note 9.

D

18

“Although modern Americans debate the legitimacy of many other ways that government may also contribute to
the commonwealth, essentially everyone agrees that providing for the common defense is its first obligation. . . . But
in practice the national interest is a very slippery concept, and different people with different personal values define
the national interest in different ways.” SAPOLSKY ET AL., supra note 10, at 1 (emphasis added).
19

If you happen to visit Albuquerque, New Mexico, we strongly recommend the National Museum of Nuclear
Science & History and its powerful Hiroshima and Nagasaki exhibit. Hiroshima and Nagasaki Exhibit, NAT’L
MUSEUM OF NUCLEAR SCI. & HIST., https://www.nuclearmuseum.org/see/exhibits/hiroshima-and-nagasaki (last
visited Jan. 9, 2022).
20
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analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter. We know we all have our limits, but why? And
where, with regard to our ethics or values, do we draw the line?21
For better or worse, it seems that Kant held sway in one of our superficial college
philosophy courses, which, in hazy recollection, centered on deontological theories of ethics,
universal moral laws, categorical imperatives, and what often seemed to be more binary
questions of right versus wrong. Sure, lying is bad, and telling the truth is good, but that “golden
rule” of “do unto others as you would have them do unto you” offered a comfortable touchstone
or centering device. How that can be reconciled with the evolution (or, increasingly, devolution)
of capitalism’s winner-take-all social construct, again, exceeds this chapter’s scope.
We concede that virtue-based ethics, focusing primarily on moral character, seem too
fluid to provide clarity or guidance. As much as we find the aspiration of the virtuous life
appealing—who would not value self-control, moderation, intelligence, pursuit of knowledge,
courage, and justice?—the thread frays once cleanliness or frugality or punctuality came into
play. Sure, it is rude to make others wait, but we are confident that most people would
distinguish that from other virtues that seem to carry greater moral weight. And let us not forget
that, from the Homeric tradition to modern-day recruiting, military service (and martial skill, nay
excellence) is about as virtuous as it gets. Let us not confuse morality with character.

D
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In another time, one might have expected America’s two-decade military engagement in
Afghanistan22 to generate a relentless focus on the ethics surrounding (and the morality of) the
military’s role abroad at some point prior to the August 2021 withdrawal that dramatically thrust
the conflict back into the public spotlight.23 Nearly a half-century since the final military draft,24
teenagers register with the U.S. Selective Service System without anxiety, and students—like
most of the public today—are further distanced from military service and all things defense-

Anecdotes can be powerful and helpful, but, ultimately, they remain, well, anecdotal. History will reflect that the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) should not have paid Dr. Bruce Jessen and Dr. James Mitchell more than
$81 million to devise rather brutal interrogation techniques, subsequently deemed to be illegal torture, yet, in pursuit
of their perceived mission at the time, the CIA appeared to fully embrace the techniques. See generally Sheri Fink,
Settlement Reached in C.I.A. Torture Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/us/cia-torture-lawsuit-settlement.html. Still, anecdotes are helpful in
discussing values. “The question . . . is a values question rather than a question with a technically ‘correct’
answer. . . . [H]ow much ‘risk’ should Americans tolerate, and how should they compare the importance of one risk
(say, of a terrorist act against the United States) to another . . . ? . . . [T]he answer is more subjective than scientific.”
SAPOLSKY ET AL., supra note 10, at 12.
21

“[T]he war [in Afghanistan] has run more than 19 years, longer than World War I, World War II and the Korean
War combined.” America’s Longest War: A Visual History of 19 Years in Afghanistan, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-longest-war-afghanistan-11583010024.
22

23

See also infra note 89.

Historical Timeline, SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., https://www.sss.gov/history-and-records/timeline (last visited Jan. 9,
2022) (“The last man inducted entered the Army on June 30, 1973.”).
24
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related than at any time in the nation’s history.25 Indeed, college and graduate students today, the
offspring and grandchildren of veterans of (or those who avoided service during) dubious
military actions in Korea and Vietnam, grew up with little reason to pay attention to, understand,
or ultimately care about the nation’s “forever wars” in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time,
current events—and the daily act of reading the news—offer frequent illustrations of the
difference between what is right and wrong, what is legal and illegal,26 or, in practice, what some
people can and do get away with,27 all of which provides valuable context for asking hard
questions in the classroom.
So, yes, at times we struggle with incorporating the complex world of ethics, morality,
and values into the work of teaching, studying, discussing, and analyzing the defense industry. In
See David Zucchino & David S. Cloud, Special Report: U.S. Military and Civilians Are Increasingly Divided,
L.A. TIMES (May 23, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-warrior-main-20150524-story.html (“Most of the
country has experienced little, if any, personal impact from the longest era of war in U.S. history.”); Bruce Drake,
On Memorial Day, Public Pride in Veterans, but at a Distance, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 24, 2013),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/24/on-memorial-day-public-pride-in-veterans-but-at-a-distance-2
(“[T]he public that will be observing [Memorial Day] is also one increasingly disconnected from the military and the
wars it fought since 2001 compared to those who lived through the wars of 20 th century.”); Steven Aftergood, The
Costs of War: Obstacles to Public Understanding, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/eprint/costs.pdf (“[P]ublic awareness of U.S. military operations [has been] diminished or
eliminated rather than heightened. . . . ‘[F]eedback loops’ that are at the heart of deliberative democracy [have been]
disabled. The public is not being forced, as it should be, to make difficult choices among competing priorities.”).

ft

25
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Before law school, as an undergraduate, one of us was exposed to many related issues through ROTC or “military
science” classes. Although the text book spoke of “humane treatment of noncombatants,” “human treatment of PW
[or prisoners of war],” “humane treatment of civilians,” and “criminal orders and individual responsibility” as legal
mandates, the text also emphasized “the unwritten laws” also “known as the customary law of war[, the general
purpose of which] . . . is to limit the suffering or destruction to military targets and to provide humane treatment for
all persons who are taken out of the fight.” See generally ROTCM 145-85, DEP’T OF ARMY, ROTC MANUAL,
FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY LAW 82–104 (Oct. 1980). Even the hypotheticals (such as “the question of what to do
if it seems to be a situation of ‘my life or his’”) have nicely stood the test of time. Id. at 100.
26

“The wealthy and powerful rarely go to jail, and, when they do, it is for relatively brief stays at ‘Club
Fed.’ . . . The rich and the powerful become richer and more powerful, while the public loses trust in our institutions.
The accumulation of wealth and power is divorced from the means and the cost of that wealth generation, such as
public ills ranging from degraded air and water quality, food poisoning, inflated consumer prices, reduced pension
funds, opioid addition, poverty, social stratification and even suicide.” Steven L. Schooner, We Need to Talk About
Corruption, GOV’T EXEC. (Sept. 29, 2020) (reviewing JENNIFER TAUB, BIG DIRTY MONEY: THE SHOCKING
INJUSTICE AND UNSEEN COST OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME (2020)),
https://www.govexec.com/management/2020/09/we-need-talk-about-corruption/168857. The four years of the
Trump administration introduced the American public to term “kleptocracy,” and generated robust discussion of a
never-ending succession of issues related to public service ethics. See generally SARAH KENDZIOR, HIDING IN PLAIN
SIGHT: THE INVENTION OF DONALD TRUMP AND THE EROSION OF AMERICA (2020). Also, for a tip of the iceberg
anecdote, see Steven L. Schooner, Kathleen Clark & Scott Amey, Suspend the Trump Organization from Doing
Business with Government, GOV’T EXEC. (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://www.govexec.com/management/2020/01/viewpoint-suspend-trump-organization-doing-businessgovernment/162672. See also Letter from Noah Bookbinder, President, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics, et al., to Bill
Schmidt, Suspension & Debarment Off., Gen. Servs. Admin., et al. (Oct. 12, 2021),
https://www.citizensforethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/2021-10-12-Trump-Organization-SuspensionReferral.pdf (“[A]gencies routinely suspend contractors based on allegations of wrongdoing similar to (or less
egregious than) those facing the Trump Organization, even when no criminal charges are pending.”).
27
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the classroom, the far more mundane topic of compliance—discussed at length in several of the
preceding chapters—resonates more clearly. No doubt, despite its lofty aspirations, compliance,
upon closer examination, is more rule-based than ethics. In that context, Philip Nichols, in
Chapter 9, makes a compelling case for why this book’s work is so important:
Legal responsibility . . . differs from moral duty. . . . [Distinguishing what is legal
and what is moral] is not a frivolous exercise. Exploring the moral responsibility
of defense firms provides insights into the relationship between those firms and
the rest of society, into the nature of defense markets, and into justifications for
anti-corruption legal regimes. . . .
. . . [In that context, with its unique opportunities for corruption, most
agree that] firms owe primary duties to society at large and to potential victims of
harm caused by the weapons and weapon systems that they sell. . . . Society
allows defense industry firms to accrue revenue for investors within this distorted
market, but in exchange for society’s forbearance, these firms must respect the
basic human right to be safe.28

D

ra

ft

Maybe, as Richard Painter suggests in Chapter 4, before we discuss the responsibilities of
defense contractors to comply with the U.S. arms export regime and ensure that the weapons
they export meet the purchaser’s quality control standards, we need to ask more fundamental
questions: is there a clear ethical or moral justification for selling powerful weapons abroad? If

Nichols at ____. As Jeffrey Biller and Timothy Goines eloquently explain in Chapter 7, our digital livelihoods
mean that our most fundamental understanding of the scope of human rights continues to evolve—in this case,
rather rapidly. For a host of reasons, today, “digital data is a crucial component of most aspects of modern life and
worthy of the highest levels of protection that the law can provide.” Biller & Goines at ___ (15). For better or worse,
one of the most challenging, vexing, and controversial topics in modern defense acquisition is the Defense
Department’s highly scrutinized effort to manage private sector cyber-security. See generally U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-22-104679, DEFENSE CONTRACTOR CYBERSECURITY: STAKEHOLDER
COMMUNICATION AND PERFORMANCE GOALS COULD IMPROVE CERTIFICATION FRAMEWORK (2021),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104679.pdf (“DOD Has Not Met Initial Implementation Goals or Sufficiently
Communicated Key Decisions to Industry”); HEIDI M. PETERS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46643, DEFENSE
ACQUISITIONS: DOD’S CYBERSECURITY MATURITY MODEL CERTIFICATION FRAMEWORK (2020)
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46643/2, (acknowledging criticism that, among other things, (1)
“DOD efforts to mitigate cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities [have been] fragmentary and reactive to specific
issues or emerging concerns, with the potential to create ‘confusion’ within the defense industrial base as contractors
attempt to meet ‘ever-changing’ requirements seen by some within the industry as costly and overly burdensome,”
and (2) “the current system, which largely turns on self-reporting . . . , has ‘demonstrably failed’”).
28
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foreign military sales in the name of joint defense are justified, do the reciprocal barter and trade
aspects (or offsets29) dilute the moral imperative?30
These economic or budgetary issues seem less value laden than the thorny issues
associated with arms proliferation,31 particularly when the consumer—no matter how well
aligned its interests—may be a less stable or, in the worst case, more aggressively hostile regime.
As Nancy Hite-Rubin cautions in Chapter 11, arms sales do not exist in a vacuum: “The transfer
of major arms into . . . politically risky markets creates major security concerns, as well as
development concerns.”32
ROBERT WOODARD, BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., DEP’T OF COM., OFFSETS IN DEFENSE TRADE – FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS (2017), https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/pdfs/1677-offsets-in-defense-trade-faqsfinal/file; see also Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751, et seq.; International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22
C.F.R. §§ 120–130; DFARS Subpart 225.73. See also Daniel Schoeni’s thoughtful exposition in Chapter 12 on
defense offsets, “a subject that has been presumed guilty without receiving a fair appraisal.” Schoeni at __ (1). We
find comfort in Schoeni’s concession that “the ethical objections [to offsets] made thus far lack force,” which “is not
to say that ethical [or moral] hazards do not exist,” though “what has been written has often been too dismissive.” Id.
at __ (2). Ultimately, however, the fact that offsets are not “an inherently corrupt practice” does little to dislodge the
traditionally perceived yoke of moral hazard. Id. at __ (19)
29

Although Edward Peartree, in Chapter 3, adds to the chorus suggesting that the U.S. government “is justifiably
proud of its reputation as the ‘gold standard’ of export controls”—a nod to a highly regulated or compliant set of
transactions—it is easy to forget that, as a consumer, the U.S. Department of Defense enjoys reduced unit prices for
many of its weapon systems because its vendors offer lower unit prices courtesy of the economies of scale
associated with global arms sales. Peartree at ___. Yes, Peartree acknowledges that “[s]tates face continuous ethical
dilemmas in their decisions whether or not to transfer arms.” Id. at __. But students will likely appreciate the oftunstated but seemingly cynical bargain associated with permitting other states to directly and indirectly subsidize
our weapons industry through arms proliferation. “Cost comparisons between [foreign military sales] and [direct
commercial sales] are often not possible, . . . [but] the FMS sale will always benefit from the economies of scale and
experience the U.S. government has with a system.” Foreign Military Sales FAQ, DEF. SEC. COOP. AGENCY,
https://www.dsca.mil/foreign-military-sales-faq (last visited Aug. 22, 2021). Yet, at the same time, in Chapter 11,
Hite-Rubin starkly warns that “defense contractors face an ethical minefield when they seek lucrative contracts from
[less developed countries, yet they represent] . . . exactly the market defense contractors must target to stay
competitive in a world where defense spending is slowing down in more developed countries.” Hite-Rubin at ___. It
is what it is: “the global defense industry is propelled by demand from institutionally weak, developing nations.” Id.
at ___. And kudos to Michael Davis for acknowledging in Chapter 13 that “[m]uch of what the arms industry sells
can be stolen, resold, transferred to another by capture, or otherwise ‘diverted [into the wrong hands].’” Davis at
___.
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ft

30

Moreover, as Mark Pyman explains in Chapter 10: “Tackling defense corruption is about much more than
stopping dodgy commissions on arms sales. Civilians and soldiers die because of corruption in defense, [and]
regional security is compromised. . . . [Rather, what is needed are] measures to tackle corruption in the defense
sector in the context of a ‘whole sector’ approach, with multiple groups collaborating with and pressuring defense
ministries, military forces, defense companies, NATO, NGOs and others.” Pyman at ___. Moreover, while Pyman
highlights the importance of “the drive and leadership of key individuals” to reform, the same can be said of the
setbacks suffered, for example, when the head of Air Force procurement goes to jail or the President disregards and
disrespects ethical statutes, regulations, policies, and norms. See generally supra note 27; infra note 49.
31

Hite-Rubin at ____ (footnote omitted). While we appreciate Michael Davis’s optimism, in Chapter 13, that
enhanced quality control—for example, safe landmines— serves the public interest and may be less “morally
objectionable,” we also appreciate his acknowledgement that “every artifact embedded in the technological system
we call ‘the military’ is there to help the military do its job, which is (by definition) to kill, wound, or otherwise
disable other human beings on a large scale or destroy property on a large scale, a morally dubious undertaking,
32
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Again, there is no shortage of ethical fodder for research and classroom banter. But do we
risk a “whataboutism” response33 when we focus on regulating or managing or marginally
improving discrete aspects of the defense industry? Is it somehow wrong to do so without instead
focusing exclusively on the overarching issue of whether our nation could exist (or even thrive)
without a defense industry (or a less massive, expensive, expansive defense industry)?
3. Assume a Peaceful World…
Imagine there’s no countries
It isn’t hard to do
Nothing to kill or die for
And no religion, too
Imagine all the people
Livin’ life in peace….34

ft

One of us vaguely recalls being amused the first time seeing the bumper sticker: It Will
Be a Great Day When Our Schools Get All the Money They Need and the Air Force Has to Hold
a Bake Sale to Buy a Bomber.35 With time and experience in the industry, the powerful clarity of
its message grew stronger, and the unflattering things it said about our priorities, our values and,
in this context, our ethics still gives cause for reflection.36

D

ra

With special conviction for one of us in particular (as a veteran, and the son of a veteran
currently resting in Arlington National Cemetery), we unapologetically affirm our desire to live
in a peaceful world. And although the military and the defense industry funded—directly and

especially if the regime directing the military is itself morally dubious.” Davis at ____. To be fair, however,
innumerable military institutions (such as the Coast Guard) and missions (such as humanitarian relief) alleviate
suffering and avoid loss of life, but the underlying point’s validity endures.
See Danielle Kurtzleben, Trump Embraces One of Russia’s Favorite Propaganda Tactics — Whataboutism, NPR
(Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/03/17/520435073/trump-embraces-one-of-russias-favorite-propagandatactics-whataboutism (observing, “One big reason whataboutism is so attractive: it’s a simple way to shrug off
criticism or even responsibility for any wrongdoings.”).
33

34

John Lennon, Imagine, on IMAGINE (Apple Records1971)

Popular bumper sticker and poster, created between 1965 and 1980, attributed to Women’s International League
for Peace and Freedom. It Will Be a Great Day When Our Schools Get All the Money They Need and the Air Force
Has to Hold a Bake Sale to Buy a Bomber, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/resource/ds.13124 (last visited Jan.
9, 2022).
35

Paul Krugman, The Bogus Bashing of Build Back Better, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/13/opinion/build-back-better.html (putting in context that “the bill’s $1.75
trillion price tag is, on the surface, a lot of money. But that’s spending over 10 years, which means that annual
outlays would be far smaller than the $1.9 trillion rescue plan passed this year or, for that matter, the $768 billion
annual defense bill the House passed [without flinching] last week.”).
36
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indirectly—much of one of our lives,37 we would still prefer to live in a state that did not spend
such staggering sums of money, and far too much of its available capital, on the defense
industry.
Even Switzerland, which is traditionally committed to (armed) neutrality and de facto
protected by NATO member states, nevertheless invests in a large military where every male
must serve as a reservist (and women may choose to serve). Across the pond, Costa Rica, often
referred to as the Switzerland of Central America, does not maintain a standing military, but
relies upon its police forces for what other states consider traditional or conventional defense.
Moreover, while most states without armed forces are relatively small, with island states
featuring prominently, many enjoy protection afforded by other states through formal and
informal agreements.

ra

4. If You’re Gonna Fight, Win

ft

Unfortunately, that peaceful world of bards and bumper stickers, desired by pacifists,
and, yes, soldiers, remains beyond our grasp. Nor do we expect to see the United States
transformed to such a state in either of our lifetimes. The defense industry—and, for that matter,
the military—does consume staggering sums of resources and does play a disproportionate role
in the public policy space. We therefore cannot afford to focus solely on broader existential
hypotheticals that might, if real, render this book’s nuanced discussions irrelevant. At least at
present, they are not real, so we have no choice but to walk the labyrinthian path and pay
attention to the ethical complexities and peculiarities of the defense industry.

D

In the spring of 1980, for the first time, one of us stepped out the door of a perfectly good
airplane in flight without a care for the seemingly mundane but oh-so-critical topic of “quality
assurance” in defense acquisition.38 That moment resonated years later when reading about
defense contracts for “man-rated items,” so designated “because the lives of people are at risk in
an emergency in the event of a failure of that system.”39 Exiting the relative safety of an inflight
aircraft, a soldier enjoys neither the luxury nor the opportunity to formally express her fervent
hope, as an “end user,” that the contracting officer40 was not satisfied with (an otherwise
impressive) 95 percent, or even 99 percent, success rate in parachute testing.
Schooner’s father served on active duty in the military until Schooner was in college, which he attended on a full
Army ROTC Scholarship. Even before college, he graduated from a Department of Defense high school in Europe,
where he actively participated in Junior ROTC. His first (non-temporary) full-time job was as an officer in the U.S.
Army, and he served in the Army Reserves for many years after leaving active duty. Much of his legal practice and,
eventually, scholarship was dominated by defense contracting or defense acquisition. As one might say, with
apologies to Minnie Minoso, Roberto Clemente, Sammy Sosa, and, of course, Chico Escuela, “the Army was very,
very good to him.”
37

See, e.g., FAR Part 46, 48 C.F.R. 46; JOHN CIBINIC, JR., JAMES F. NAGLE & RALPH C. NASH, JR.,
ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 697–790 (5th ed. 2016).
38

39

Appeal of Astro Dynamics, Inc., ASBCA No. 28381, 88-3 BCA ¶ 20,832 (1988).

The contracting officer, a creature of statute and regulation, is the appointed official with authority to (among
other things) bind the government in contract. See generally FAR 1.102-3; FAR Subpart 1.6. See also FAR 1.602-1
40
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It is easy to forget about the end user—the consumer of what the defense acquisition
system delivers to the warfighter—at the proverbial tip of the spear. But pause for a moment and
remember that, for the parent or spouse or relative of such an end user, the defense industry
looks quite different; indeed, the concept of “customer satisfaction” takes on a whole new
meaning. Consider, then, the juxtaposition in which the Iraqi population, and, over time, the
American public, came to revile the name Blackwater, while innumerable State Department
officials, Members of Congress, and others returned home to their loved ones thankful for and
appreciative of Blackwater’s (admittedly heavy-handed and risk-averse) protection.41 All of
which brings to mind the sublime proverb: Until the Lion writes history, the tale of the hunt will
always glorify the hunter.42

ra

ft

So long as we maintain a military, and until we lay down our arms, this perspective—the
soldier’s perspective—matters. In government contracting policy discussions, we like to
emphasize the “end user,” and defense acquisition experts refer to “the warfighter” as the
ultimate customer. Is that perspective the highest ethical imperative? In Chapter 5, General
Ayres, Kevin Govern, and Michael W. Meier suggest that “no one longs for peace like the
experienced soldier. But, when war comes, no one longs for superior technology and weapons
like a soldier.”43 Indeed, they go so far as to posit that the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) do
“not require a fair fight, nor [do they] prohibit the use of superior offensive or protective
weaponry.”44 Is military superiority, in and of itself, a worthy ethical pursuit? For an armed
combatant, or the relative of an armed combatant, that likely sounds like music to anxious ears.
Until our military force becomes fully automated,45 we cannot ignore this perspective.

D

(“Contracting officers have authority to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts and make related
determinations and findings.”).
“I think on balance we felt that . . . the protective security operation has been highly effective.” Special Briefing
with Patrick F. Kennedy, Ambassador, Dept’ of State, on the Report of the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal
Protective Services in Iraq (Oct. 23, 2007), https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/94019.htm.
41

See, e.g., Annalisa Quinn, Chinua Achebe and the Bravery of Lions, NPR (Mar. 23, 2013),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/03/22/175046327/chinua-achebe-and-the-bravery-of-lions. In more
concrete terms, “‘[s]ilo mentality’ is a widely occurring phenomenon wherein a profession . . . or an organization
itself is so focused on their priorities or their expertise that they neglect or fail to perceive how those priorities affect
or are affected by other professions, divisions . . . , or others in their industry.” Patricia Werhane at ___.
42

43

Ayres, Govern & Meier at ___ (32).

Id. at ___ (11). We concede being far less sanguine with the more extreme position staked out by Duncan
Macintosh in Chapter 2: “It is the measure of the goodness of a culture how good its weapons are — the better the
weapons, the better the culture.” Macintosh at ___. For us, that is a logical, philosophical, and, in this context,
ethical bridge too far.
44

In Chapter 8, Blake Hereth and Nicholas G. Evans draw attention to the exploding potential and promise (and
potential ethical problems) of artificial intelligence (AI) and the future of, among other things, lethal autonomous
weapon systems (LAWS). Hereth & Evans at __ (1). During the prior generation, advancements in unmanned
vehicles, remote piloting, and, increasingly, robotics drastically altered and animated a battlefield far different from
prior experience. See generally Steven L. Schooner & Nathaniel Castellano, Dawn Of the Intercontinental Sniper:
The Drone’s Cascading Contribution to the Modern Battlefield’s Complexity, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 321
45
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5. Not Your Grandparents’ (Nor Eisenhower’s) Defense Industry
One of this volume’s great contributions is the organized fashion in which it discretely
analyzes many of the pathologies spawned by our long-standing military-industrial complex.46
Yes, problems remain. But we have also seen real progress, ranging from industry cognizance
and commitment to the evolution of compliance regimes, adoption of codes of conduct, and
proliferation of voluntary disclosures systems.47 At the same time, some of those problems
simply are not as problematic as they might seem, and others cannot be laid entirely at the feet of
the defense industry. Again, it is complicated.

D

ra

ft

As frustrated as many of us have become with over-reliance on the military-industrial
complex trope,48 it serves as a helpful reminder that many of the ethical issues that arise from the
context—kinetic solutions to social problems, staggering sums of money spent in the grey area
where ends justify the means, etc.—do not conform to intellectually lazy categories. Not all
public servants are inherently good, nor are all contractor personnel greedy profiteers and pigs at

(2016) (reviewing RICHARD WHITTLE, PREDATOR: THE SECRET ORIGINS OF THE DRONE REVOLUTION (2014)).
Looking ahead, the range of potential issues is bounded only by our imaginations. See, e.g., Erico Guizzo, How
Boston Dynamics Is Redefining Robot Agility, IEEE SPECTRUM (Nov. 27, 2019), https://spectrum.ieee.org/howboston-dynamics-is-redefining-robot-agility. On a lighter (but nonetheless eye-opening) note, see Boston Dynamics,
Do You Love Me?, YOUTUBE (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fn3KWM1kuAw.
Supra note 13. Legislation, regulation, compliance regimes, self-regulation, professionalization, transparency, and
innumerable other inputs have led us to where we are today, where defense acquisition is dominated by massive,
sophisticated firms, supplemented by an ever-changing cast of new entrants and innovators. Nonetheless, given the
stakes, it is “scholarly neglect” to not contemplate these issues more frequently, and “this book aims to contribute to
a field of study whose significance has been underappreciated.” Schoeni & Vestner at ___.
46

47

See infra text accompany notes 54–62. See also supra note 18.

“[T]he ‘military-industrial complex” is often the bogeyman of journalistic investigations and conspiracy theories.”
SAPOLSKY, ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
48
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the trough.49 From the end of the twentieth century and into the post-millennial outsourcing era,50
what happens to our preconceptions of military culture and norms of behavior51 when the U.S.
military cannot see, move, fight, communicate, or sustain itself without a fully integrated
contractor presence?52 Yet as exhaustive and as thought-provoking as this volume proves, it
In looking back over the last few decades, even taking into account Blackwater’s notorious 2007 Nisour Square
massacre, it is impossible to tilt the scales sufficiently to conclude, let alone empirically demonstrate, that private
sector behavior in the government contracting marketplace has been in any way less ethical, virtuous, or compliant
than that of government officials, including the (former) President. See generally Laurel Wamsely, Shock and
Dismay After Trump Pardons Blackwater Guards Who Killed 14 Iraqi Civilians, NPR (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/12/23/949679837/shock-and-dismay-after-trump-pardons-blackwater-guards-who-killed14-iraqi-civil; Falih Hassan & Jane Arraf, Blackwater’s Bullets Scarred Iraqis. Trump’s Pardon Renewed the Pain,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/23/world/middleeast/blackwater-trump-pardon.html
(“For some survivors of the attack, President Trump’s pardon of the Blackwater contractors was a bitter reminder of
what Iraqis have always viewed as a lack of concern over Iraqi lives.”). Consider, among other high-profile
scandals, that while “Fat Leonard” animated the most pervasive post-millennial scandal, hundreds of military
officers and personnel put the Navy’s Seventh Fleet’s culture on trial, top to bottom. Craig Whitlock & Kevin
Uhrmacher, Prostitutes, Vacations and Cash: The Navy Officials “Fat Leonard” Took Down, WASH. POST (Sept.
20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/seducing-the-seventh-fleet/. Before that, the
Darlene Druyun saga saw both the Air Force’s senior procurement official and the Chief Financial Officer of one of
the nation’s largest companies (and household names), Boeing, Michael M. Sears, spend time in the federal
penitentiary. John A. Tirpak, Druyun’s Downfall, AIR FORCE MAG.: WASH. WATCH (Nov. 1, 2004),
https://www.airforcemag.com/article/1104watch.

ft

49

Even at the peak of the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, where an increasingly blended battlespace saw
contractors performing tasks previously considered the domain of uniformed personnel, or inherently government
(or military) functions, the discussion of these difficult issues was short-lived. See Rachel Augustine Potter, Macro
Outsourcing: Evaluating Government Reliance on the Private Sector, J. POL. (forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3907539 (“Today, state governments routinely offload . . . government functions to the
private sector. This trend is replicated at the federal level, where contractors help fight wars, run prisons, collect
taxes, write regulations, render benefit decisions, and shape policy.”); see also ALLISON STANGER, ONE NATION
UNDER CONTRACT: THE OUTSOURCING OF AMERICAN POWER AND THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN POLICY (2011); PAUL C.
LIGHT, THE GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: THE TRUE SIZE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1984-2018
(2019); Steven L. Schooner, The Well-Reasoned Case for Reversing the Outsourcing Trend: A Review Essay of Jon
Michaels’ CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 59 GOV’T CONTRACTOR
¶ 319 (2017); Rebecca R. Vernon, Battlefield Contractors: Facing Tough Issues, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 369 (2004);
Michael Davis, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with Civilian Contractors on the
Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233 (2000); Steven L. Schooner & Daniel S. Greenspahn, Too Dependent on
Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance, 6 J. CONT. MGMT. 9 (2008); Steven L. Schooner,
Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549 (2005); SEAN MCFATE, THE MODERN MERCENARY: PRIVATE ARMIES AND WHAT THEY
MEAN FOR WORLD ORDER (2015).
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50

For a fascinating historical perspective on how far we have come in this regard, see, for example, CHARLES
EDWARD WHITE, THE ENLIGHTENED SOLDIER: SCHARNHORST AND THE MILITARISCHE GESELLSCHAFT IN BERLIN,
1801-1805 (1989). White’s historical vignette chronicles the transition from a feudal (or royal) monopoly over the
arms-bearing “arts” to the more modern profession of citizen soldiers, selected on merit, educated (not only in
combat-related skills, but also in critical thinking and problem solving), led (in battle) by a meritocracy rather than
the worst byproduct of a monarchy: ever-diminishing, arrogant, insular, ill-prepared, and closed-minded bloodlines.
See also infra note 85.
51

See SAPOLSKY, ET AL. supra note 10 at 8–9, 298–99 (“The question policy-makers need to ask is: What must be
retained as governmental or public, in the acquisition of weapons, training of soldiers, and the conduct of war? What
tasks must the government perform directly to ensure its monopoly on the legitimate use of force . . . ? . . . The
52
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merely scratches the surface. But like any good academic exercise,53 it makes us confront that
which we fail to think about, that which we take for granted, and that which we must not ignore.
Problems remain, scandals occur, and it is perfectly reasonable to hold the defense
industry, which, as Leo Mackay reminds in his Foreword, “builds instruments of destruction and
lethality[, used] to maintain [the public’s] way of life, even [its] very existence,”54 to a higher
standard than the general commercial marketplace.55 Fortunately, as a number of the chapters in
this book explain, the defense acquisition landscape is far more regulated, responsible,
transparent, and compliant than when Eisenhower left the White House. On the one hand, while
all may not share Mackay’s optimism that “we have come a long way regarding the most salient
ethical challenges in the defense industry,” it does appear that “national laws and industrial
standards are rising and becoming mainstream,”56 and that trend is a source of optimism. The
public and the private blend in providing America’s defense. Private firms develop America’s most advanced
weapons and deploy personnel along with the troops to help them fight more effectively.”); see also GOVERNMENT
BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freemen & Martha Minow eds., 2009); supra
note 18.
In Chapter 4, Richard Painter’s four-part thought experiment offers an excellent opportunity to unpack some of
these issues. Painter at ___ (2–5, 11–14). In addition to the broad legal principles addressed in Painter’s chapter,
students (or for that matter, scholars) might be asked to read, compare, and contrast the coverage and guidance
found in some of the major defense contractors’ (publicly disclosed) codes of conduct to see if they would inform,
guide, or constrain the contractors’ (or their C-suites’ or directors’) actions. For example, the world’s largest defense
contractor, Lockheed Martin, publishes (in more than a dozen languages) its code of ethics and business conduct,
which “details the high expectations we set for employee behavior, from our commitment to good citizenship to our
zero-tolerance policy on corruption, serving as the most basic building block for future success.” Code of Conduct,
LOCKHEED MARTIN, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/who-we-are/ethics/code-of-ethics.html (last visited Jan.
9, 2022).
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53

Mackay at ___. In Chapter 3, Edward Peartree reminds us that much of the weapons market involves international
arms trafficking, of the legalized sort, which in the U.S. is sanctioned under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
regime and cabined by the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR). See Peartree at ___ (“If you are a
defense firm selling your products pursuant to FMS, all aspects of the sale are subject to a legally binding ‘letter of
offer and acceptance’ [LOA] between the United States and the foreign government recipient.”). See generally
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public (last
visited Jan. 9, 2022); AECA, 22 U.S.C. § 2778; ITAR, 22 C.F.R. 120–130.
54

Again, in Chapter 4, Richard Painter poses a thorny policy problem, juxtaposing a loyalty aspiration for profitseeking defense contractors against a longstanding congressional bias in favor of maximizing competition. Although
many readers might instinctively agree that “companies should only be allowed to compete for large-scale U.S.
Government defense contracts if they certify, in articles of incorporation or by-laws or elsewhere, and disclose to
shareholders, that a primary purpose of the enterprise is to strengthen the national security,” Painter at ___(18), that
approach runs contrary to more than two decades of congressional policy, nay, insistence, that the defense
acquisition marketplace not be limited to conventional defense firms. See, e.g., FAR 12.101, 48 C.F.R. 12.101
(mandating that agencies “[a]cquire commercial products, commercial services, or nondevelopmental items when
they are available to meet the needs of the agency”); see also FAR 2.101, 48 C.F.R. 2.101 (defining “commercial
product” in a manner that suggests a commercial product or service “is of a type customarily used by the general
public or by nongovernmental entities for purposes other than governmental purposes” (emphasis added)).
55

Mackay at ___. Credit should go to Norman Ralph Augustine, who served, among other roles, as Under Secretary
of the U.S. Army and later as chairman and CEO of the Lockheed Martin Corporation, for his leadership on these
issues. See Richard G. Weingardt, Norman Ralph Augustine, 9 LEADERSHIP & MGMT. ENG’G 149 (2009). But see
William D. Hartung, Saint Augustine’s Rules: Norman Augustine and the Future of the American Defense, 13
56
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industry has taken massive strides, prodded and propelled by a broad range of inputs, including
but by no means limited to:
•

conventional oversight and law enforcement organization, such as, in the U.S.,
Congress, GAO, DoJ, the IG community, and the Interagency Suspension and
Debarment Committee (ISDC);57

•

governmental institutions abroad, such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)58 and the Geneva Centre for Security
Sector Governance (DCAF);59

•

civil society, including Transparency International (TI);60 and

•

the industry itself, led by, among others, the Defense Industry Initiative on
Business Ethics and Conduct (DII),61 the International Forum on Business Ethics
and Conduct (IFBEC),62 and the International Stability Operations Association
(ISOA).63

Failure to acknowledge the significance of the change, and the dramatically improved

ra

ft

WORLD POL’Y J. 65 (1996) (“It is hard to fault Augustine for driving the best possible bargain for his company, but
one has to question the process by which he achieved his goal.”).
See generally Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee (ISDC), ACQUISITION.GOV,
https://www.acquisition.gov/isdc-home (last visited Jan. 9, 2022); Exec. Order No. 12,549, 51 Fed. Reg. 6370 (Feb.
18, 1986).
58

D

57

Anti-Corruption & Integrity Hub, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/corruption-integrity (last visited Aug. 22, 2021).

What is DCAF, GENEVA CTR. FOR SEC. SECTOR GOVERNANCE, https://dcaf.ch/about-us (last visited Jan. 9, 2022);
see also Private Military and Security Companies: Implementation of Montreux Document, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/private-military-and-security-companiesimplementation-montreux-document.
59

Transparency International’s priorities include defense and security, see What Is Defence and Security and
Corruption?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/en/our-priorities/defence-and-security (last
visited Aug. 22, 2021), and public procurement, see Public Procurement, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
https://www.transparency.org/en/our-priorities/public-procurement (last visited Aug. 22, 2021).
60

61

DEF. INDUS. INITIATIVE ON BUS. ETHICS & CONDUCT, https://www.dii.org (last visited Aug. 22, 2021).

About, INT’L FORUM ON BUS. ETHICS & CONDUCT FOR THE AEROSPACE & DEF. INDUS., https://ifbec.info/about
(last visited Aug. 22, 2021).
62

INT’L STABILITY OPERATIONS ASS’N, https://stability-operations.org (last visited Aug. 22, 2021). “ISOA was
founded . . . as the International Peace Operations Association [IPOA].” Id. at https://stabilityoperations.org/page/History. In particular, see ISOA’s “Code of Conduct, which represents a constructive effort
towards better regulating private sector operations in conflict and post-conflict environments and disaster relief. It
reflects our belief that high standards will both benefit the industry and serve the greater causes of peace,
development, and human security.” Id. at https://stability-operations.org/page/Code.
63
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state of affairs, is as inaccurate as it is unfair. Of course, that does not suggest our work is
complete, and plenty of room for improvement and growth remains. To that end, it is
unsurprising that, in a high-stakes market involving hundreds of billions of dollars flowing
through tens of millions of contractual agreements, new scandals constantly reveal themselves.
Nor should it surprise us that the oversight community publishes a steady stream of critiques,
that contractors over-promise or find themselves stretched too thin, that individuals behave
badly, or that mistakes are made.
History reminds us that it is easy (and popular) to criticize the defense industry and, more
broadly, the military-industrial complex. If you read GAO’s seemingly never-ending tsunami of
reports on the defense industry,64 you could be forgiven for concluding that the Department of
Defense is adrift, defense acquisition is in tatters, and no one knows where far too much of the
money has gone. To a hammer, everything is a nail. And while oversight is necessary, it does not
tell the whole story. Not surprisingly, academic study and closer examination breeds familiarity
with complex issues that may explain certain pathologies, but nonetheless fail to illuminate a
path to better practices or outcomes.65 Patricia Werhane, in Chapter 16, explains:

ra

ft

When there is wrongdoing in our society, . . . an individual, group of
individuals, or an organization is or are often singled out for
blame. . . . But sometimes, at least, these misdeeds occur not because of
deliberate malfeasance, but rather because of complex collective action
that produced these negative outcomes.66

D

It is also intellectually lazy to focus criticism exclusively on “the defense industry,” or
the private sector’s (or, in other words, defense contractors’) failures and shortcomings when: (1)
Congress exercises complete control over the defense budget, (2) individual members of
Congress aggressively endeavor to maximize defense spending that benefits their constituents,
(3) contractors cannot sell what governments will not buy, and (4) government authorization
(and, typically, facilitation) is a prerequisite for selling their wares abroad. Arguably no better
recent anecdote exposes the absurdity of congressional defense priorities than the military’s
inability to retire the A-10 from service.67

For a representative sample, see the annual High Risk List, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
https://www.gao.gov/high-risk-list (last visited Oct. 7, 2021) (heavily populated with defense-related topics) or visit
the GAO’s topical pages focused on, inter alia, National Defense, https://www.gao.gov/topics/national-defense (last
visited Oct. 7, 2021), Auditing and Financial Management, https://www.gao.gov/topics/auditing-and-financialmanagement (last visited Oct. 7, 2021), Budgeting and Spending, https://www.gao.gov/topics/budget-and-spending
(last visited Oct. 7, 2021), or Veterans, https://www.gao.gov/topics/veterans (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
64

Discussing the life cycle of a major weapon system, and the various (typically polarized) perceptions of their
history and utility, can be understood by analogy to the parable of the blind men and the elephant, commonly
attributed to the ancient Indian subcontinent. As a single anecdote, see Steven L. Schooner & Nathaniel E.
Castellano, Review Essay: Reading THE DREAM MACHINE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NOTORIOUS V-22 OSPREY,
by Richard Whittle, in Light of the Defense Acquisition Performance Study, 43 PUB. CONT. L.J. 391 (2014).
65

66

Werhane at ___.
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For more than a decade, Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire highlighted government
waste with a monthly “Golden Fleece” award.68 Although spread across government
instrumentalities, the defense industry was criticized for investing (a relatively modest sum) in a
study to determine whether umbrellas should be carried by uniformed personnel.69 But history
reminds us that one critic’s waste is another’s passion, priority, policy, pet project, or, well,
“pork.” For example, what is the economic utility of the federal government maintaining
multiple undergraduate institutions to produce entry-level officers? How can the federal
government tolerate its military academies loosening their academic standards and diverting
(allegedly scarce) resources to groom potential athletes for the purpose of competing against
institutions of higher education funded by individual states or the private sector?70 From either an
ethical or a fiscal law standpoint,71 it is a long, tortured path from publicly funding competitive
collegiate sports to the social imperatives associated with the nation’s safety and security.

See Mike Stone, The Warthog and the Senator: The Politics of Retiring a Warplane, REUTERS (July 16, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/warthog-senator-politics-retiring-warplane-2021-07-16 (“The U.S. Air Force is
desperate to get rid of some of its fleet of expensive, slow and outdated A-10 Warthog airplanes, but politicians have
blocked the move, aiming to keep the local dollars flowing.”); see also Derek O’Malley & Andrew Hill, Close Air
Support in 2030: Moving Beyond the A-10/F-35 Debate, WAR ON THE ROCKS (May 28, 2015),
https://warontherocks.com/2015/05/the-a-10-the-f-35-and-the-future-of-close-air-support-part-ii (elaborating upon
the misplaced priorities in the debate to retire the A-10 and quoting former Air Force Chief of Staff—and former A10 pilot—General Mark Welsh: “I find myself arguing to get rid of things that I don’t want to get rid of to pay a bill
we’ve been handed. And the people [that] tell me I can’t give up anything to pay it, are the people who gave us the
bill. It’s a strange situation.”).
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67

See, e.g., Reestablish the Golden Fleece Award, 161 Cong. Rec. H3397 (daily ed. May 20, 2015) (statement of
Rep. Hill), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2015/05/20/house-section/article/H3397-2.
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68

The idea that, for generations, it was considered improper for uniformed personnel to carry umbrellas flummoxes
us to this day. Ben Kesling, Semper Dry: Now Marines Can Carry Umbrellas, Setting Off Stormy Debate, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/semper-dry-now-marines-can-carry-umbrellas-setting-off-stormydebate-11573494284 (noting that “[f]emale Marines were given permission to use umbrellas back in 1972 . . . [while
t]he Army, Navy and Air Force have long authorized umbrellas for use by both sexes”).
69

Billy Witz, How a Military Prep School Helped Army Improve in Football, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/09/sports/army-prep-school.html. The service academies originally formed prep
schools to create opportunities for enlisted soldiers to become officers and to increase diversity; today they also use
prep schools to be more competitive in Division I sports, primarily football and basketball, instituting a de facto
redshirt year during which these athletes to get bigger, stronger, and faster. And before you ask how much the
academies lower their academic standards, assume you don’t want to know. “The mean SAT score for this year’s
class at the prep school was about 130 points [or just over 10 percent] lower than that of the cadets who were
admitted directly to the academy. . . . While Army won’t be admitting anyone with a 2.0 grade-point average or an
800 SAT score, . . . the admissions committee ha[s] been encouraged to take a more inclusive view of an applicant’s
file, including community service, leadership, character and athletic traits.” Id.
70

One of the fundamental statutes dealing with the use of appropriated funds is 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a), also known as
the purpose statute: “Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made
except as otherwise provided by law.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-797SP, Availability of
Appropriations: Purpose, in PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 3-1, 3-9 (4th ed. 2017) (quoting 31
U.S.C. § 1301(a)), https://www.gao.gov/assets/2019-11/687162.pdf.
71
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At the same time, history reminds us that, although anecdotes of wasteful spending are a
given and counting defense scandals is good sport, particularly in light of the military’s massive
scale and insatiable needs and desires, anecdotes can be deceiving.72 Just as the familiar triad of
“fraud, waste, and abuse” often clumps together different pathologies and proposed remedies,
over-emphasis on anecdotes of defense industry shortcomings potentially paints an inaccurate
picture and distract us from fundamental, often intractable, issues.73
6. The Forest, … And The Trees
I've been living to see you
Dying to see you
But it shouldn't be like this
This was unexpected
What do I do now?
Could we start again, please?

ra
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I've been very hopeful, so far
Now, for the first time
I think we're going wrong
Hurry up and tell me
This is just a dream
Or could we start again, please?74

D

In retrospect, we may fairly be criticized, in examining defense industry ethics, for
focusing on the failings and tension points—or what we might consider implementation
pathologies—that arise within a large, complicated military-industrial complex. As we isolate
discrete issues, problems, and quandaries, our various topical tasks permit us to take for granted
that the nation needs a large military-industrial complex. Although we acknowledge the harsh
reality that we do not live in a peaceful world, we do not, as noted above, address why the United
States should (or should not) be our allies’, the region’s, or even (at its most aspirational)
democracy’s protector and enforcer. We welcome that debate.

And, of course, historical events can generate multiple storylines and parables. For many, familiarity with the
WW II sinking of the U.S.S. Indianapolis (which delivered one of the atomic bombs’ components before becoming
the last American ship sunk during the War) is limited to the iconic galley scene from the movie JAWS (Universal
1975), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9S41Kplsbs. When the wreck was discovered in 2017,
18,000 feet below the surface, many of us learned, for the first time, that Navy Captain Charles B. McVay III, who
had been court-martialed for the loss of his ship in a high-profile, but deeply flawed proceeding, was exonerated
after he committed suicide. See DOUG STANTON, IN HARM’S WAY (2001) for a powerful case study in diffusion of
responsibility, scapegoating, and a failure of military justice.
72

73

See, e.g., supra note 21.

ANDREW LLOYD WEBBER & TIM RICE, Could We Start Again Please?, on JESUS CHRIST SUPERSTAR (MCA
Records 1973)
74
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But even that issue is framed too narrowly. How carefully do we endeavor to quantify the
externalities, effects,75 or opportunity costs of our massive military-industrial complex and, more
broadly, our martial instincts, culture, and self-image? Maybe the most pernicious aspect of the
centrality of a high-profile military extends far beyond the defense industry. For many nonAmericans, one of the defining features of what it means to be an American is the pervasive and
destructive gun culture.76 The American Public Health Association (APHA) reminds us that gun
violence is a “leading cause of premature death” in the United States: “Each year, more than
39,000 people in the United States die as a result of gun violence, and tens of thousands more
suffer non-fatal gun injuries.”77 While APHA advocates that “[g]un violence is not inevitable,”
there seems minimal political will to address “[t]he burden of gun violence in the United States[,
which] vastly outpaces that in comparable countries.”78
Baby Boomers grew up inspired by the technological advances spawned from NASA’s
pursuit of a moon landing: from freeze-dried food to fire-retardant suits and integrated circuits.
Today, as we look outward towards space, as Brian Green explains in Chapter 6, it is not only
the next frontier, but it also raises a raft of additional, complex questions.79 Meanwhile, many
point to the militarization of police forces as the natural evolution of the defense industry’s
pursuit of broader markets.80 These are not idle concerns. And if you are worried about the state
We encourage use of the term “effects” instead of “negative externalities.” See generally KATE RAWORTH,
DOUGHNUT ECONOMICS 123 (2017). Let us “drop the economist’s beloved notion of ‘externalities,’ those incidental
effects felt by people who were not involved in the transaction that produced them. . . . Due to the scale and
interconnectedness of the global economy, many economic effects that were treated as ‘externalities’ in the
twentieth-century theory have turned into defining social and ecological crises in the twenty-first century.” Id.
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75
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“[I]t is no coincidence that . . . the U.S. . . . is also a gun culture. For what is true in the large in this case is also
true in the manner of fractals right down to the small. . . . [T]he cost is 30,000 lives per year in gun violence. But the
cost buys you absolute immunity to invasion from without, and from certain kinds of tyranny within.” MacIntosh
at___.
76

Gun Violence Is a Public Health Crisis, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, https://www.apha.org//media/Files/PDF/factsheets/200221_Gun_Violence_Fact_Sheet.ashx (last visited Jan. 9, 2022).
77

Id. How much of that core value derives from a zealous extrapolation of a 1791 Constitutional amendment
asserting that “[a] well regulated Militia . . . [is] necessary to the security of a free State”? U.S. CONST. amend. II. It
is beyond the scope of this exercise to attempt to unpack how, in good faith, or through principles of interpretation,
the first thirteen words in a twenty-seven-word sentence can be so easily, broadly, and vociferously ignored.
78

As “the exploration and use of the space domain have grown . . . , new threats have emerged that require ever
more vigilant, well-equipped, and ready military forces to defend the vital space capabilities of the United States and
her allies.” Green at ____. It seems axiomatic that “[a]s the barriers to entry for having a military presence in space
have lowered over time and more countries therefore enter this domain, a policy of self-restraint may not serve to
resolve all ethical dilemmas that are international in nature.” Id. at ___.
79

“[T]he idea is the Pentagon bought this stuff originally for the military, doesn’t need it anymore and can give it to
local police departments.” David Brancaccio, Rose Conlon & Candace Manriquez Wrenn, How Police Departments
Got Billions of Dollars of Tactical Military Equipment, MARKETPLACE (June 12, 2020),
https://www.marketplace.org/2020/06/12/police-departments-1033-military-equipment-weapons; see also Michael
Leo Owens, Tom Clark & Adam Glynn, Where Do Police Departments Get Their Military-Style Gear? Here’s What
We Don’t Know, WASH. POST (July 20, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/20/where-dopolice-departments-get-their-military-style-gear-heres-what-we-dont-know; 1033 Program FAQs, DEF. LOGISTICS
80
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of the planet that your children and their children will inherit and inhabit, it is disheartening that,
beyond the public purview,81 the U.S. military consumes more fossil fuels than any other
institution in the world.82 So be sure to add the climate crisis83 to the list of ills exacerbated by
our massive military expenditures and activities.
Acknowledging these broader issues and incorporating them into the debates of defense
industry ethics requires us to step back and remember to notice both the forest and the trees. As
Patricia Werhane reminds us in Chapter 16: “the process of stepping back, which conscientious
individuals often engage in—challenging standard operating procedures, ingrained habits, and
rote decision processes—is also possible in organizations. This sort of thinking entails moral
imagination and moral courage.”84
Are we a moral state? One common refrain of the coronavirus pandemic is that we are a
toxic (and sadly mean-spirited) collection of profoundly selfish individuals, lacking the goodwill
that binds together healthy communities.85 Are we capable of moral action, of acting in our own,
AGENCY, https://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/Offers/Reutilization/LawEnforcement/ProgramFAQs.aspx (last
visited Aug. 22, 2021) (explaining that the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act “granted permanent authority
to the Secretary of Defense to transfer defense material to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies”).
We consider it inane that military greenhouse gas emissions continue to be exempted from reporting and national
commitments following COP26. See, e.g., Tom Ambrose, World’s Militaries Avoiding Scrutiny over Emissions,
Scientists Say, GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/nov/11/worldsmilitaries-avoiding-scrutiny-over-emissions (“Armed forces are among the biggest polluters on the planet but are
avoiding scrutiny because countries do not have to include their emissions in their targets . . . . The world’s
militaries . . . are estimated to create 6% of all global emissions, according to Scientists for Global Responsibility
(SGR). COP26, held in Glasgow from October 31 through November 13, 2021, refers to the 26th conference of the
parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). See generally Glasgow
Climate Change Conference, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int (last visited Jan. 9, 2022).
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81

“The U.S. military is an energy guzzler—it is the institution that consumes the most fossil fuels in the world. In
fact, its carbon emissions are greater than those of many countries.” Leah C. Stokes, A Field Guide for
Transformation, in ALL WE CAN SAVE: TRUTH, COURAGE, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE CLIMATE CRISIS 337, 341
(Ayana Elizabeth Johnson & Katharine K. Wilkinson eds., 2020). On a more positive note, see MICHAEL T. KLARE,
ALL HELL BREAKING LOOSE: THE PENTAGON’S PERSPECTIVE ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2019), which chronicles DoD’s
under-the-radar “steps to mitigate its contributions to global warming,” despite then-President Trump’s Executive
Order “instruct[ing agencies] to abandon their efforts to enhance climate preparedness.” Id. at 1–2; Exec. Order No.
13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/31/201706576/promoting-energy-independence-and-economic-growth.
82

“It is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the atmosphere, ocean and land. . . . Human-induced climate
change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe. . . . Projected
changes in extremes are larger in frequency and intensity with every additional increment of global warming[.]”
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 4, 8, 18 (2021),
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM_final.pdf.
83

84

Werhane at ___.

See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Cult of Selfishness Is Killing America, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/27/opinion/us-republicans-coronavirus.html; see also Robin Givhan, Americans
Are Stubbornly Unmoved by Death, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2021),
85
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or our children’s, best interests?86 During the peak of post-9/11 American military activity in
Iraq and Afghanistan, we were constantly reminded that ethics and morality are neither as
consistent nor as philosophical as the academic thinking in undergraduate classrooms. We
publicly celebrate active-duty military but underinvest in veterans’ health care and pay lip
service to the scourge of post-9/11 veteran suicide.87 No number of standing ovations at ball
games and concerts compensate for this long-running tragedy.
Bear in mind that those horrific statistics do not include contractor personnel—the
anthropomorphic manifestation of Eisenhower’s ire—who, for much of the post-millennial era,
have not only outnumbered uniformed military in the battlespace, but have paced their level of
sacrifice—in terms of injuries and fatalities—as well.88 Long before the overdue, brief, and
grossly inadequate efforts undertaken by the Biden administration in the summer of 2021, our
government (specifically the Departments of Defense and State) consistently hung out to dry and
left behind the interpreters and other “battlefield allies, who often braved death threats and put

D

ra

ft

https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/03/23/americans-are-stubbornly-unmoved-by-death (“Increasingly it
seems that we simply do not care about the other person, that other family, someone else’s child. The self is
everything. It’s freedom and liberty, whims and desires. Community doesn’t extend beyond one’s front door.
Everything else is someone else’s concern.”); infra note 90. Against that backdrop, see Leo Mackay’s implicit yet
poignant reminder, in this volume’s Foreword, that institutions—government and private, from military services to
multinational defense contractors—are communities of individuals. Mackay at __. It is perfectly reasonable to
expect those institutions, including Mackay’s Lockheed Martin, to “hire ethical people and then train and mentor
them on applying ethical principles when they face tough decisions,” but it is naïve to suggest that process is the
optimal starting point for any discussion of ethical leadership, decision-making, or problem-solving. Id. at 5. Rather,
government institutions and private contractors “hope that new employees come with well-tuned moral
compasses . . . [calibrated by] lessons . . . nurtured in childhood [and] instilled through the higher education system.”
Id. It is only as a last resort, “when all else fails, [that ethical norms must be] enforced by governments.” Id.
See, e.g., Ezra Klein, What if American Democracy Fails the Climate Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/22/magazine/ezra-klein-climate-crisis.html; see also supra text accompanying
notes 80–82.
86

“The overall suicide rate for veterans is 1.5 times as much as the rate for civilians. Among post-Sept. 11 veterans
between 18-years-old and 35-years-old, the rate is 2.5 times that of all civilians . . . .” Jennifer Steinhauer, Suicides
Among Post-9/11 Veterans Are Four Times as High as Combat Deaths, a New Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (June 22,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/22/us/911-suicide-rate-veterans.html. See generally National Veteran
Suicide Data and Reporting, U.S. DEP’T OF VET. AFF., https://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/suicide_prevention/data.asp
(last visited Aug. 22, 2021); SAPOLSKY, ET AL., supra note 10, at 288. See also Steven L. Schooner & Nathaniel E.
Castellano, The VA Grand Challenge: Looking for Love in the Wrong Places, GOV. EXEC. (May 20, 2020)
https://www.govexec.com/management/2020/05/va-grand-challenge-looking-love-wrong-places/165527.
87

Steven L. Schooner & Collin Swan, Dead Contractors: The Un-Examined Effect of Surrogates on the Public’s
Casualty Sensitivity, 6 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 11 (2012) (reporting that on the modern battlefield, contractor
personnel die at rates similar to—and at times in excess of—soldiers); Steven L. Schooner, Remember Them Too:
Don’t Contractors Count when We Calculate the Costs of War?, WASH. POST, May 25, 2009, at A21. You are
forgiven if this sounds familiar to the way that our Border Patrol callously treated and recklessly separated
immigrant parents and children. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-245, SOUTHWEST BORDER: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO IMPROVE DHS PROCESSING OF FAMILIES AND COORDINATION BETWEEN DHS AND HHS (2020),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-245.pdf (reporting that agents had not correctly recorded family separations and
official were unsure of the extent of the problem).
88
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their families at risk of retribution” in support of American military and diplomatic efforts.89 Our
failure to educate the public on these issues is, to our minds, an irresponsible, improvident, and
short-sighted moral and ethical failure.90 This is not to say that we are by nature a fundamentally
amoral state or that we are incapable of moral action. But it does serve to remind us that, even if
we can summon the appropriate levels of moral courage, none of these issues are easily resolved.
Defense policy is polarizing—not only when engaging in warfare but when preparing for
or, hypothetically, avoiding it. But the state’s power to wage war—its so-called monopoly over
the use of force—plays an outsized role in many of our nation’s policies. We are ill-served if we
are not constantly thinking, discussing, and, yes, voting on relevant issues. To our minds, this
was Eisenhower’s ultimate plea: that an “alert and knowledgeable citizenry”91 would influence
our elected leadership to make ethical decisions for the public good. It may seem obvious that,
“[i]n a representative democracy, few decisions are more significant or heavily scrutinized than
the decision to engage in heavy, sustained, military action abroad.”92 But if we do not study and
Editorial Board, America Must Not Turn its Back on Battlefield Allies from Iraq and Afghanistan, WASH. POST
(Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/america-must-not-turn-its-back-onbattlefield-allies-from-iraq-and-afghanistan/2019/01/30/a3c969f4-2317-11e9-81fd-b7b05d5bed90_story.html;
Helene Cooper & Eric Schmitt, U.S. to Move Afghans Who Aided Troops Outside the Country, N.Y. TIMES (June
24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/24/us/politics/afghan-interpreters-visas.html (“More than 18,000
Afghans who have worked as interpreters, drivers, engineers, security guards, fixers and embassy clerks for the
United States during the war [and their 53,000 family members] have been trapped in bureaucratic limbo after
applying for special immigrant visas, available to people who face threats because of work for the U.S.
government.”). On a slightly positive note, the controversy surrounding the 2021 removal of U.S. armed forces from
Afghanistan served to ever so fleetingly insert some of these issues into the public consciousness. Mark Cancian, In
Afghanistan, Contractors Were Unsung Heroes of US Efforts, BREAKING DEF. (Aug. 30, 2021),
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/in-afghanistan-contractors-were-unsung-heroes-of-us-efforts.
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This critique applies across the policy spectrum. See generally Kayla Chadwick, I Don’t Know How to Explain to
You that You Should Care About Other People: Our Disagreement Is Not Merely Political, but a Fundamental
Divide on What it Means to Live in a Society, HUFFPOST (June 26, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/i-dontknow-how-to-explain-to-you-that-you-should_b_59519811e4b0f078efd98440.
90

91

To place that quote in context, Eisenhower said,
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence,
whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise
of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination
endanger our liberties or democratic processes. . . . Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can
compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our
peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Eisenhower, supra note 13, at 1035.
Schooner & Swan, supra note 88, at 11. During this book’s final editing stage, the 2021 withdrawal of armed
forces from Afghanistan thrust these issues into the public domain. See generally Ted Van Green & Carroll Doherty,
Majority of U.S. Public Favors Afghanistan Troop Withdrawal; Biden Criticized for His Handling of Situation, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 31, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/08/31/majority-of-u-s-public-favorsafghanistan-troop-withdrawal-biden-criticized-for-his-handling-of-situation (“[T]here is notable agreement among
members of both parties that the U.S. mostly failed in achieving its goals in Afghanistan. Nearly identical majorities
of Republicans (70%) and Democrats (69%) say the U.S. failed to accomplish its goals there.”). See also Catie
Edmonson, Lawmakers Unite in Bipartisan Fury over Afghanistan Withdrawal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2021),
92
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discuss the relevant issues and policies, how can we expect to rely on our citizenry to push
leadership in the right direction?
All of this brings us back to where Schoeni and Vestner began in the Introduction, with a
compelling analogy to the law of war:
Consider how this relates to the law of war, which governs how wars are conducted
(jus in bello). This volume assumes that wars will continue and that a large share
of global wealth will be devoted to the manufacture of arms for the foreseeable
future. Though industry is temporally and physically removed from the battlefield,
how and in what manner it equips forces are questions of great moral significance,
effectively questions about jus in bello. Just as soldiers are judged for their conduct
in battle, so also can industry be held to account for the acquittal of its duties. Jus
in bello is designed to limit the suffering caused by war. In a similar fashion,
studying the moral questions about the manufacture, sale, and distribution of arms
may teach us how to curtail any unnecessary harm that this bloody industry causes.
Such an industry must exist, but its ethical shortcomings can be identified, studied,
and perhaps even mitigated.93
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Just as the transparency community advocates that “sunlight is the best disinfectant,”94
the academic community is well served to keep scholars and students talking and thinking about
the defense industry, warts and all. The thorny issues discussed in this volume challenge us to
think, force us to ask difficult questions, and evade simple resolution. But they are also far too
important for a representative democracy—a government of the people—to take for granted. If
academic institutions aspire to remain robust marketplaces of ideas, teachers, students, and
scholars must keep the discussion going.

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/16/us/politics/afghanistan-withdrawal-congress.html; Peter Nicholas, Biden Is
Betting Americans Will Forget About Afghanistan, ATLANTIC (Aug. 20, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/08/biden-afghanistan-midterms/619838 (“For all the intense focus
in Washington on the Taliban’s resurgence, the broader public seems more preoccupied with other issues, like the
still-raging coronavirus pandemic. . . . One former Biden campaign aide [noted that], ‘ . . . at the end of the day,
voters care about things that affect them and their families.’”).
93

Schoeni & Vestner at _____.

One longs for the day when readers will have forgotten (or never knew) that it was during the Trump
administration that the Washington Post added “Democracy Dies in Darkness” to its masthead. See Wash. Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2022).
94
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